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This paper addresses three issues related to the relative rates of growth in the United States, the European
Union, and China during the four decades between 2000 and 2040. The first concerns the source of
the factors which make it likely that China will continue to grow at a high rate for another generation.
The paper argues that this growth will be the result of both favorable economic and political conditions.
The second concerns the source of declining GDP growth in the original fifteen nations of the European
Union. For these countries, the underlying cause is due in large measure to low fertility rates and an
increase in the dependency ratio. The third issue is the projection of long-term U.S. growth in GDP
at a rate of 3.7 percent per annum.
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2000  2040  2000  2040 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
France  37.7  44.2  16.1  26.5 
Germany  40.0  51.2  16.4  31.8 
Italy  40.3  50.9  18.4  31.8 
Spain  37.6  49.1  16.8  28.1 
























Country  2000  2040  Percentage decline 
France  47.5  38.3  19 
Germany  46.8  34.6  26 
Italy  47.0  34.4  27 
Spain  50.8  35.8  30 


























































Country  2000  2040  Percentage Increase 
France  .54  .75  39 
Germany  .47  .79  68 
Italy  .49  .81  65 
Spain  .46  .72  57 
United Kingdom  .54  .64  19 
Source: http://esa.un.org/unpp (2008 revision) 
 
The inverse of one plus the dependency rates is a reasonable proxy for the labor force 
participation rate (which I designate by ρ). Hence, Table 4 suggests an annual rate of decline of 0.4 
percent in the labor force participation rate due purely to changes in the age structure of the 
population. I allow ρ to decline by an additional 0.2 percent per annum because of a reduction in the 
length of the work year over the period 2000–2040. This allowance raises the annual rate of decline in ρ 
to 0.6 percent per annum. Since I expect the annual rate of growth in labor productivity of the 5 nations 
to average about 1.8 percent, it follows that their annual rate of growth in both per capita income and 
GDP will average 1.2 percent. 
Now let me turn to my forecast for the United States. Although the U.S. and EU‐15 growth rates 
were the same during 1975–2005, I do not believe that to be an overriding consideration. The key issue 
is the slowness of the EU relative to the U.S. in adopting the new information technology. Other issues 
are the greater EU preference for leisure than commodities when compared with the U.S., and the 
decline of the EU’s annual rate of growth in labor productivity from 2.4 percent during 1980–1995 to 1.5 
percent during 1995–2004. By comparison, U.S. labor productivity growth increased from 1.5 percent 
per annum during 1980–1995 to 3.0 percent during 1995–2004 (van Ark et al. 2008). 9 
 
During 1995–2004, U.S. GDP grew at 3.7 percent per annum. I believe that this high rate will 
persist down to 2040 because of continuing technological advances in genetic engineering, health care, 
information technology, transportation, energy production and consumption, and education (van Ark et 
al. 2008).  10 
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